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I.
INTRODUCTION
The allocation of powers remains one of the most controversial subjects in
the integration process of the European Union. The European Union is no
longer linked just to economic integration; it has increasingly become more
* Visiting Professor of Law, Concordia International University Estonia School of Law;
Assessor iur., Germany, 1994; LL.M. University of Wisconsin, 1995; S.J.D. University of Wisconsin, 1999.
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state-like and political. In fact, after one of the latest Intergovernmental Conferences of the Member States at the Nice European Council in December 2000,'
the European Union adopted a Charter of Fundamental Rights. 2 Additionally,
the European Union is preparing for3 its fifth enlargement, with the goal of nearly
doubling the Union's membership.
The increasing integration of the European Union continues to cause Member States to fear the proliferation of European competences. The increasing use
of majority voting has dramatically diminished the influence of each individual
Member State; the Member States no longer retain an unlimited veto power over
the decision-making process or the depth of integration throughout the Community. Similar to the debate in the United States over the extent to which the
Tenth Amendment limits the powers of the federal government, the Member
States of the European Union continue to seek means by which the unrestricted
growth of Community powers can be limited. Moreover, in response to increasing disapproval rates of European integration among European Union citizens,
the Member States also try to ensure national identity within the Union.
In an attempt to address these concerns, the Member States resolved to
include additional provisions in the Community Treaties. The goal was to prevent further distance between the Union and its citizens while at the same time
recognizing the importance of cultural differences among the Member States.4
The result was the Principle of Subsidiarity, which was first incorporated in the
European Community Treaty through the Maastricht Treaty. 5 At the Nice Euroin the newly
pean Council in December 2000, the principle was also included
6
adopted Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
1. See Presidency Conclusions: Nice European Council Meeting, 7, 8, and 9 December 2000,
http://europe.eu.int/council/off/concluldec2OOO/dec2OOOen.htm#1 [hereinafter Presidency Conclusions]; Treaty of Nice, Dec. 22, 2000, http://ue.eu.int/cigdocs/en/cig2000-EN.pdf (Dec. 22, 2000)
(provisional text approved by the intergovernmental conference on institutional reform). For the
consolidated version of the Treaty of Nice, see Mar. 10, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1.
2. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364). The legal
status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights must still be decided by the Member States.
3. See Presidency Conclusions, supra note 1, $ 4-10.
4.

See Preamble of the TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [hereinafter TEU], May 1, 1992, http://

europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu cons-treatyen.pdf, July 29, 1992 O.J. (C 191), consolidated
version incorporating changes made by the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European
Union, Oct. 2, 1997 O.J. (C 340), which states: "[The leaders and political representatives of the
Member States], CONFIRMING their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law, DESIRING to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions, DESIRING
to enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions so as to enable them
better to carry out, within a single institutional framework, the tasks entrusted to them . . . RESOLVED to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in
which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity .... "; see also TEU art. 2(3) which states: "The Union shall set itself the following
objectives ... to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member
States through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union .... "; furthermore, see TEU art. 6(3)
stating: "The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States."
5.

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (signed in Rome on March 25, 1957),

consolidated version, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 5 (ex art. 3(b)), O.J. (C 340) 173 [hereinafter EC TREATY].
6. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 51, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 8, 21.
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The Principle of Subsidiarity was intended to be a federal principle by
which legislative decisions in the European Union would be taken at the most
appropriate level. However, since the introduction of the Principle of Subsidiarity, many questions continue to surround the meaning of subsidiarity in
Community law. For example, how can the Principle of Subsidiarity be applied? Which Community institution should interpret and review compliance
with subsidiarity? Is the Principle of Subsidiarity justiciable and enforceable? It
is the thesis of this article that the Principal of Subsidiarity, despite its broad and
abstract structural concept, is a positive and applicable rule of law in the legal
context of the European Union. In fact, the Principle of Subsidiarity must be
considered a functional principle, which cannot consist of a material determination or a strict enumeration of Community powers. A different issue is, however, the question whether the interpretation of the Principle of Subsidiarity may
be pursued in an objective manner. Indeed, the interpretation of subsidiarity
may be determined by changing national self-interest and specific bargaining
positions of the Member States.
In the first section this article examines the different meanings of subsidiarity, its character as a doctrine of social philosophy and the origins of the
concept of subsidiarity in the Community Treaties. The second section of this
article describes the community approach to application, interpretation and review of compliance with subsidiarity. In this context, the Principle of Proportionality and the procedural requirement to Show Sufficient Grounds are
considered as tools for judicial review and first developments in the case law of
the European Court of Justice are discussed. Finally, against the background of
political economic theory, the article will highlight a number of contradicting
perspectives and limitations within the Principle of Subsidiarity.
II.
THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY
A.

Differences in Meanings and General Understandingof Subsidiarity

Since the Maastricht Treaty, Community institutions are obliged to abide
by the Principle of Subsidiarity in the application of the European Community
Treaties. In addition, the Nice European Council extended the application of the
Principle of Subsidiarity to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union. The Treaty on European Community explicitly states:
In areas which do not fall within the exclusive competence, the Community shall
take action, in accordance with the Principle of Subsidiarity, only if and in so far
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and can therefore, by reason of7 the scale or effect of the proposed
action, be better achieved by the Community.
7. EC TREATY art. 5(2) (ex art. 3b(2)). With regard to the wording of the Subsidiarity
Clause, one is compelled to notice the similarities to the Tenth Amendment of The U.S. Constitution: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." However, clear differences must be
noticed as well. For example, one obvious difference is the finality in which the Tenth Amendment
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This clause sets forth the basis of subsidiarity in the European Union.
Subsidiarity cannot be explained in a simple fashion; it continues to have a
variety of meanings. In its theological meaning, subsidiarity is understood as a
structural principle concerning the relationship between the society and the state
or the individual and the state.8 The Principle of Subsidiarity thereby broadly
refers to the limits of the right and duty of the public authority to intervene in
social and economic affairs. 9 It is the integrating element of an idealistically
contemplated constitution of state and society. The principle clearly distinguishes between the actions of different levels of authority in a society or state,
whereby the highest or most centralized level should only take actions if and
insofar as a subordinate level cannot achieve the same goal in a better or equally
sufficient way. o
In legal terms, the Principle of Subsidiarity is considered to determine the
relationship between different legal provisions. For instance, if a number of
legal provisions apply to one statement of affairs or if a single action violates
more than one statute, those provisions which are less specific or apply only in
the alternative are not applicable to the case and must be rejected. The latter
provisions only enjoy subsidiary validity. It is only this meaning of subsidiarity
that seems to be common among the different European legal systems.
When taking the different meanings of subsidiarity into account, it is difficult to determine which specific meaning was utilized in the execution of the
concept in Community law. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Principle of
Subsidiarity must be interpreted in terms of a structural principle. The aim of a
structural principle of that kind is a clear regulation of the distribution of powers
between the Community and the Member States. This conclusion places the
Principle of Subsidiarity in relation with one principle with which it is often
confused, federalism.
It cannot be denied that many correlations exist between subsidiarity and
federalism." In German constitutional scholarship, this was recognized in the
appears to determine the reservation of powers on the state level. In contrast, the Subsidiarity Clause
allows the European Communities to act under certain preconditions even if the actions to be taken
do not fall within the exclusive competences of the Community.
8. Roman Herzog, Subsidiaritattsprinzip, in EVANGELISCHES STAA-rSLEXIKON col. 3564 (Hermann Kunst et al., eds., 1987); Roman Herzog, Subsidiaritdisprinzip und Staatsverfassung, DER
STAAT 399, 399-411 (1963); Walter Sch6psdau, Subsidiaritdtsprinzip, in EVANGELISCHES
KIRCHENLEXIKON: INTERNATIONALE THEOLOGISCHE ENZYKLOPADIE, col. 539-40 (Erwin Fahlbusch et

al. eds., 1997).
9. R.E. Mulcahy, Subsidiarity, in NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 762 (Cath. Univ. of
America, 1981).
10. While this definition seems clear, one troubling aspect is apparent. Although not extremely prevalent with regard to the European Communities, in its general and abstract meaning, the
Principle of Subsidiarity raises questions as to the basis or starting point of its comparison of different levels of authority. Specifically, the principle poses the question of which levels of authority
must be placed in juxtaposition or serve as comparative figures.
11. The U.S. Supreme Court Case Cooley v. Philadelphiaillustrates such a correlation. The
Cooley doctrine maintains that "states are free to regulate those aspects of interstate and foreign
commerce so local in character as to demand diverse treatment" See Cooley v. Board of Wardens of
the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. 299 (1851), Yet, the Cooley doctrine did prove to be inadequate.
Accordingly, after Cooley the U.S. Supreme Court increasingly focused on the method and context
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late 19th century and founded on the acknowledgment that both principles share
the synthesis of two primary facts of human culture, individualism and unity as
well as independence and community. 12 While both subsidiarity and federalism
attempt to achieve this goal, they are distinguished by their different approaches.
The goal of subsidiarity is the definition of different levels of authority in state
and society as well as the appropriate distribution of powers thereof. In contrast,
the necessary connection of state and society is the aim of federalism. Thus, on
one hand federalism presupposes and follows subsidiarity. On the other, federalism provides the frame in which subsidiarity is exercised. In its broadest
sense, federalism involves the linking of individuals, groups, and polities in a
lasting but limited union in such a way as to provide for the energetic pursuit of
common ends while maintaining the respective integrity of all parties. 13
B.

Subsidiarity as a Structuraland Ontological Principle in Theology

For a full understanding of the Principle of Subsidiarity, it is necessary to
view it in the context of the theological doctrine of social philosophy, from
which it originates. As a socio-structural and ontological principle, the idea of
subsidiarity is particularly rooted in the Catholic doctrine of social philosophy
and the Catholic teachings on social reconstruction, in which context subsidiarity concerns the 4relationship between the society and the state or the individual and the state.'
The idea of subsidiarity was first introduced in the Catholic doctrine of5
social philosophy by the encyclical letters of Pope Leo XIII, Immortale Dei1
and Rerum Novarum. 16 In the encyclical, Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII noted
that "[i]t is not right ...for either the citizen or the family to be absorbed by the
State; it is proper that the individual and the family should be permitted to retain
without jeopardizing the comtheir freedom of action, so far as this is possible
7
mon good and without injuring anyone."'
of challenged regulations. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw at 1048 (3d

ed. 2000).
12. KONSTANTIN

FRANTZ, DER FODERALISMUS ALS DAS LEITENDE PRINZIP FOR DIE SOZIALE,

STAATLICHE UND INTERNATIONALE ORGANISATION UNTER BESONDERER BEZUGNAHME AUF DEUTSCHLAND (1879); see also MAX HANE, DIE STAATSIDEEN DES KONSTANTIN FRANTZ (1929). Please note

that K. Frantz is cited only for reference, not to advocate his ideas on nationalism or his role in Nazi
Germany.
13. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 5 (1987).
14. See, e.g., OSCAR V. NELL-BREUNING, BAUGESETZ DER GESELLSCHAFT (Freiburg i. Br.)
(1968); Karl Homann & Christian Kircher, Dos Subsidiarittsprinzip in der Katholischen Soziallehre und in der Okonomik, in EUROPA ZWISCHEN ORDNUNGSWETTBEWERB UND HARMONISIERUNG:
EUROPAISCHE ORDNUNGSPOLITIK IM ZEICHEN DER SUBSIDIARITAT 45, 45-54 (Lider Gerken ed.,

1995).
15. Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Immortale Dei, November 1, 1885, http://www.vatican.va/
holy-father/leo-xiii/encyclicals/documents/ff e-xiiienc-01111885 immortale-dei-en.htmi.
16. Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Rerum Novarum, May 15, 1891 (St. Paul ed., Boston); John
69
(St. Paul ed.,
Paul I, Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus, May 1, 1991, s. 15, p. 24; s. 48, p.
Boston); see also Mulcahy, supra note 9, at 762.
17. Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Rerum Novarum, May 15, 1891, s. 52, p. 32 (St. Paul ed.,
Boston).
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In the understanding of the Catholic doctrine, the Principle of Subsidiarity
was, however, most distinctly enunciated by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical letter
QuadragesimoAnno, in 1931.18 Pope Pius XI asserted:
It is indeed true, as history clearly proves, that owing to the change in social
conditions, much that was formerly done by small bodies can nowadays be accomplished only by large corporations. Nonetheless, just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to the community at large what private
enterprise and industry can accomplish, so, too, it is an injustice, a grave evil and
a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization to arrogate to
itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower bodies.
This is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, unshaken and unchangeable,
and it retains its full truth today. Of its
t 9 very nature the true aim of all social body,
but never to destroy or absorb them.
In turning from the negative emphasis of his formulation to positive
thought, Pope Pius XI then concludes:
The state should leave to ... smaller groups the settlement of business of minor
importance. It will thus carry out with greater freedom, power and success the
tasks belonging to it, because it alone can effectively accomplish these, directing,
watching, stimulating and restraining, as circumstances suggest or necessity demands. Let those in power, therefore, be convinced that the more faithfully this
principle be followed, and a graded hierarchical order exist between the various
subsidiary organizations, the more excellent will be both the authority and the
as a whole and the happier and more prosefficiency of the social organizations
20
perous the condition of the state.
Subsidiarity was thereby defined in the context of the reconstruction of the
social order and the authority of the church in the social and economic sphere,
conferred to the Christian constitution of the state. Toward the end of the 19th
century, and the early 20th century, the Catholic doctrine was particularly critical of increasing individualism in contrast to a well-developed social life, which,
in the past, was characterized by the organic linkage of institutions. 2 , Following
19th century liberalism, the church saw the social order to be in jeopardy; society had reached a point at which it was composed for the most part of individual
members and the state, while intermediate bodies to regulate juridical and economic conditions were lacking at best. 2 2 In other words, as a result of the deterioration of the structures within society, the state proved increasingly unable to
18. Pius Xl, Encyclical Letter Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931, 39 (St. Paul ed., Boston).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 40-41 (textual emphasis added by the author).
21. Isaiah Berlin describes this development throughout Europe convincingly with the conception of "man as demiurge." See Isaiah Berlin, European Unity and its Vicissitudes, in THE CROOKED
TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 175, 190 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991).
According to Berlin, this concept, expressed by Fichte, Carlyle and Nietzsche, shattered the unitarian
European world. "Independence - capacity to determine one's own course-[became] as great a
virtue as interdependence once was." Id. at 190-91. Following the program of Enlightenment and
utilitarianism, the conflict and interplay between the older universal ideal founded upon reason and
knowledge, and the new romantic ideal which ultimately led to extreme nationalism and to Fascism.
id. at 192-94.
22. Pius XI, Encyclical Letter QuadragesimoAnno, May 15, 1931, 40 (St. Paul ed., Boston);
John XXIII, Encyclical Letter Mater et Magister, May 15, 1961, s. 10-40, p. 6-13 (St. Paul ed.,
Boston); John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Centesitnus Annus, May 1, 1991, s. 4-1I, p. 11-18 (St. Paul
ed., Boston).
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protect public welfare. In terms of the reconstruction of the state, the church
believed that the solution was a more social life.
As a result, the focus shifted from the interest of the individual to the community, one represented by appropriate public and private institutions and governed by justice and charity as the principal laws of social life.2 3 Although this
explains the background and goal of the reconstruction of the state in Catholic
doctrine, the merits of the Principle of Subsidiarity remain somewhat obscure.
For a full understanding of subsidiarity, it is important to further examine the
Church's underlying definition of the relationship between state and society.
According to the social doctrine of the Catholic Church, society consists of
a form of subjectivity, 24 which holds that "the social nature of man is not completely fulfilled in the State, but is realized in various intermediary groups, beginning with the family and including economic, social, political and cultural
groups which stem from human nature itself and have their own autonomy." 2 5
Social life in a community at large is, however, not understood as disposing of
an end in itself,26 rather the ulterior motive remains the individual member at all
times.27 In short, men and women are defined as social beings whereby society
and community enable them to "more fully and more readily ... achieve their
own perfection."'2 8 This definition correlates with the grammatical meaning of
the word subsidium, aid or help.
In Catholic doctrine these indirect conditions are characterized as the com29
mon good, which stands for the sum total of the conditions of social living.
The common good can only be achieved when personal rights and duties are
guaranteed. 30 This is where the Catholic Church determines the task of the
state. The state as an institution oversees and directs the exercise of rights and
intervenes where necessary. In addition, the state may also exercise a substitute
function when social sectors or business systems are too weak. Nonetheless, the
primary responsibility "belongs not to the state but the individuals and the variIn this understanding,
ous groups and associations which make up society.'
the socio-structural concept of the Principle of Subsidiarity is further promul23. John XXIII, Encyclical Letter Mater et Magistra, May 15, 1961, s. 38-40, p. 12-13 (St.
Paul ed., Boston).
24. John Paul I, Encyclical Letter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, Dec. 30, 1987, s.15, p. 25, s. 28, p.
47-50 (St. Paul ed. Boston); John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus, May 1, 199 1, s. 13, p.
21 (St. Paul ed., Boston).
25. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus, May 1, 1991, s.13, p. 21 (St. Paul ed.,
Boston).
26. See the original text of the encyclical in Latin: "socialis quaevis opera vi naturaque sua
subsidium afferre membris corporis socialis debet." Pius XI, Encyclical Letter Quadragesimo anno,
May 15, 1931, p. 203, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, XXIII (1931).
27. See, e.g., Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Immortale Dei, supra note 16, 1 2-3.
28. Pope John XXIII, Encyclical Letter Mater et Magistra, May 15, 1961, s. 65, p. 21 (St. Paul
ed., Boston).
29. Mulcahy, supra note 9.
30.

John XXIII, Encyclical Letter Pacem in terris, Apr. 11, 1963, s. 60, p. 20 (St. Paul ed.,

Boston); Pius XII, Radio Message, Pentecost, June 1, 1941, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, XXXIII, 1941,
p. 198-203.
31.

Boston).

John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus, May 1, 1991, s. 48, p. 68 (St. Paul ed.,
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gated. The community at large renders service to lower and smaller bodies; it
outlines conditions which enable them to function more effectively.
The Principle of Subsidiarity, in the context of the Catholic Church, does
not define an auxiliary or subsidiary means. Nor does it provide a substitute for
deficient powers or lack of efficiency on the level of lower bodies of authority.
Yet, even where the state as the community at large must intervene, it must be
remembered that intervention is only an aid to the lower society or individual.
Such intervention cannot destroy the different levels of society by permanently
taking over their functions or preempting their sovereignty.
In sum, subsidiarity in its theological context illustrates two main characteristics. First, in activities of society and state, subsidiarity cannot be understood as an alternative means of intervention where individuum and smaller
bodies are unable to perform their duties. Therefore, subsidiarity does not convey the necessary and often problematic substitute for missing powers or the
lack of efficiency on lower levels of society or state. Second, subsidiarity can
only serve as a political guideline or a mere principle. As a rule of law open and
susceptible to enforcement, the Principle of Subsidiarity would 32require the additional step of its incorporation or transfer into a legal system.
C.

Origins of Subsidiarity in the EEC Treaty, Article 130r Sec. 4

In the context of the European Communities, the Principle of Subsidiarity
is not entirely new. The principle was first introduced in the Treaties through
the Single European Act and Article 130r Sec. 4 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community. With regard to Community actions relating to
the environment, the Treaty stated that "the Community shall take action ... to
the extent to which the objectives referred to ...can be attained better at Community level than at the level of the individual Member States. ' ' 33 The objectives under which the Treaty allowed the Community to act focused34primarily on
the preservation, protection and improvement of the environment.

32. Although the Principle of Subsidiarity is derived predominately from the Catholic doctrine
of social philosophy, the idea of subsidiarity can also be found in the writings of Plato, Aristotle,
Thomas Aquinas and Johannes Althusius. See, e.g., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book II, 369b-369c
(John M. Cooper ed., 1997); ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, Book 12, 1252aI-1253a29 (T. A. Sinclair &
Trevor J. Saunders trans., Penguin Books 1992); Paul E. Sigmund, Thomistic Natural Law and
Social Theory, in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS: A NEW TRANSLATION, BACKGROUNDS, INTERPRETATIONS 180, 184-88 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., 1988); JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA METHODICE DIGESTA, ATQUE EXEMPLIS SACRIS ET PROFANIS ILLUSTRATA, Chapter X-XVII, 74-86

(Frederick S. Carney trans., 1964); see also Otfried Hdiffe, Subsidiaritdt als staatsphilosophisches
Prinzip?, in SUBSIDIARITAT: EIN INTERDISZIPLINARES SYMPOSIUM 19-46 (Alois Riklin & Gerard Bat-

liner eds., 1994).
33. TREATY OF ROME ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,
art. 130r(4), 298 U.N.T.S. 1 [hereinafter EEC TREATY] as amended by the Single European Act, 25
I.L.M. 506, 515 (1986) [hereinafter SEA].
34. EEC TREATY art. 130r(l), as amended by SEA, supra note 33.
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However, the interpretation and meaning of EEC Treaty, Article 130r Sec.
4 remained controversial among the Member States. 35 The difference of opinion centered around the question of whether the article contained a rule of law or
merely a political guideline. The wording of the provision and the Member
States' expressed intention to improve the protection of the environment supports a binding character or legal obligation, at least with regard to environmental issues. Thus it can be argued that the applicability of EEC Treaty, Article
130r Sec. 4 and the Principle of Subsidiarity established therein might be
limited.
The idea of subsidiarity in the Community Treaties is not limited to the
EEC Treaty, Article 130r. It is incorporated in numerous other Community provisions. For instance, pursuant to the Treaty on European Community, Article
3(h), the approximation of laws of the Member States proceeds only to the extent required for the functioning of the common market.36 EC Treaty Article 94
(ex Article 100) specifies that the approximation of such laws only result if they
37
market."
"directly affect the establishment and functioning of the common

Likewise, other provisions justify Community actions only with regard to a specific goal, such as the Internal Market or the Common Market; sufficient
grounds must prove the necessity of actions for the achievement of Community
objectives. 3 8 Finally, the legal instrument of Community directives clearly illustrates the idea of subsidiarity. Community directives are "binding, as to the
choice of form and methods" for their
result to be achieved" while leaving "the
39
States.
Member
the
to
implementation
These different provisions unmistakably convey the presence of the idea of
subsidiarity throughout the Community Treaties. The Principle of Subsidiarity,
even before its adoption through the Single European Act and the Maastricht
Treaty, was acknowledged as a general principle by the Community Treaties.
The explicit adoption of the Principle of Subsidiarity through the Maastricht
4
Treaty exemplifies the distinct and unambiguous affirmation of that fact. 0 In
spite of a general acknowledgment of the Principle of Subsidiarity, the meaning
and importance of the Principle of Subsidiarity remained somewhat obscure. An
attempt should therefore be made to interpret the meaning of subsidiarity in the
context of European integration and with regard to its value as a measure for
decentralization.

35. See, e.g., THOMAS OPPERMANN, EUROPARECHT 745-46 (C.H. Beck) (1991); Manfred
Zuleeg, Vorbehaltene Kompetenzen der Mitgliedstaaten der Europaischen Gemeinschaft auf dem
Gebiet des Umweltschutzes, NEUE ZEITSCHRLFT FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ] 280 (1987).
36. EC TREATY art. 3(h) (ex art. 3(h)).
37.
38.

EC TREATY art. 94 (ex art. 100).
EC TREATY art. 14 (ex art. 7a) & art. 308 (ex art. 235).

39. EC TREATY art. 249 (ex art. 189).
40. It should be noted that with the amendment of the Community Treaties through the Maastricht Treaty, EEC TREATY art. 130r (4) was abolished and art. 130r reworded. As a result of the
Amsterdam Treaty, art. 130r was renumbered. It is now EC TREATY art. 174.
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III.
THE SUBSIDIARITY CLAUSE, APPLICATION AND
JUSTICIABILITY
A.

Application of the Subsidiarity Clause

The Community Treaties define the application of the Principle of Subsidiarity in a negative sense, stating that: "[Tihe Community shall take action, in
accordance with the Principle of Subsidiarity, only if and in so far as . . .the

proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States.'
Despite this definition, both a positive and a negative reading seem appropriate. In
its negative meaning, the clause protects the prerogatives of the Member States
against undue Community interference. In contrast, the positive reading indicates that the Community should be allowed to act where such action appears
necessary. This interpretation clearly suggests that Community competences
were the primary focus of the Member States.42 That is, the traditional vision of
federalism, characterized by the view that a clear line should be drawn between
the respective competences of the center and the periphery, was at the center of
the Member States' concern.
Accordingly, Article 5 Sec. 2 (ex Art. 3b Sec. 2) stresses that only "areas
which do not fall within [the] exclusive competence [of the Community]" are
subject to the application of the Principle of Subsidiarity. 43 This indicates that
subsidiarity is only important in relation to powers that are shared between the
Community and the Member States or in areas of concurrent competences. 44
While the Subsidiarity Clause does not clearly stipulate the allocation of powers
between the Community and its Member States, it postulates that the Community, in addition to its exclusive powers, maintains an additional area of power
which rests within the broad frame of Community goals. As such, subsidiarity
in fact determines the limitation of existing, not exclusive powers, and defines
the dynamics in Community integration. It is in this context that the Principle of
Subsidiarity signifies more than a mere guideline; it is incorporated into the
legal system of the Community Treaties and establishes a rule of law.45
Turning to the wording of the Subsidiarity Clause, subsidiarity envisages a
twofold test. First, measures at the national level must be reviewed by the Community. This review might include the analysis of financial resources, legal in41.

42.

EC TREATY art. 5(2) (ex. art. 3b(2)). (textual emphasis added by author).
Manfred Zuleeg, Justiziabilitdt des Subsidiaritdtsprinzips, in SUBSIDIARITAT: IDEE UND

WIRKLICHKEIT: ZUR REICHWEITE EINES PRINZIPS IN DEUTSCHLAND UND EUROPA 185 (Knut Wolfgang Nrr & Thomas Oppermann eds., 1997); Renaud Dehousse, Does Subsidiarity Really Matter?,

in EUI WORKING PAPER No. 92/32, at 7 (European University Institute ed., 1992). This view is
opposed by Dieter Grimm, who was a Justice on the German Supreme Court. See, e.g., Dieter
Grimm, Effektivitdt und Effektivierung des Subsidaritdtsprinzips, 77 KRITISCHE VIERTELIAHRESSCHRIFT FOR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 6-12 (1994).
43. EC TREATY art. 5 (ex art. 3b).
44. See Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 616, 625-26 George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarily Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 331, 334.
45. Manfred Zuleeg, Artikel 3b EC Treaty, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EU-/EG VERTRAG, Vol. 1,
225 (Hans van der Groeben et al.eds., 1997).
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struments and possibilities of enforcement. Overall, the review must
' 46
can be "suffidemonstrate whether "the objectives of the proposed action"
47
Second, the Community must evaluciently achieved by the Member States."
ate whether "by reason of the scale or the effect of the proposed action," its
objectives can be "better achieved by the Community."4 8
The relevant standard of judgment is whether a Community goal can be
materialized on a Member State or national level. However, as a prior step to
this judgment a valid Community goal must be determined. Community institutions cannot arbitrarily name any goal thought to be worth pursuing. A valid
Community action is commanded by the objectives and goals assigned by the
Treaty. 49 And so, the evaluation of the twofold test required by the Subsidiarity
Clause can only be set in motion by reference to a legitimate Community goal.
While the first test of the Subsidiarity Clause aims at the evaluation of the
most effective action, it is inaccurate to merely limit the application of the Principle of Subsidiarity to a comparison of effectiveness. 50 The adverb "sufficiently" illustrates the emphasis on effectiveness. However, it is highly
questionable whether the determination of effectiveness in this context is justiciable. Instead, the determination of effectiveness is a political question to be
answered by the legislature. 5 ' For example, even if a Community goal can only
be achieved in part by Member State action, this does not satisfy the test of
insufficiency. As indicated by the conjunction "in so far," the Community can
only pursue actions to the extent to which subordinate national levels prove ineffective. In the above example, this would amount to actions limited in parts.
While those parts of a Community goal which can be sufficiently achieved by
national authorities, the remainder
the Member States must be addressed by
52
must be regulated by Community action.
The second test of the Subsidiarity Clause aims at the "scale or effects" of
proposed Community actions. Both terms are rather vague and general in their
meaning, making it difficult to render a specific interpretation for the application
of subsidiarity on this basis. In fact, the only interpretation follows from the
grammatical use of conjunctions. The connection of "scale" and "effect" with
the coordinating conjunction "or" seems to lower the standard of judgment. An
alternative rather than an additional requirement is emphasized. On the other
46.
47.

EC TREATY art. 5 (ex art. 3b (2)).
Id.

48. Id.
49. EC TREATY art. 5 (ex art. 3b (1)).
50. This was particularly defined by the Commission as the "value added test." See The Principle of Subsidiarity, Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ParI. Eur. Annex Doc. SEC (92) 10.
51. Zuleeg, supra note 42, at 228 § 24; see also Dehousse, supra note 42.
52. Note that although "shared" legislation of that kind may actually improve the issue of
accountability, it places the issue of efficacy into a new context. With regard to varying capacities
of different Member States, it seems questionable as to which conclusions may be reached accordingly. Does this imply a patchwork of different Community regulations throughout Europe, differing by Member State? If Member States are unable to achieve Community goals alone but are able
to do so together with other Member States, are bilateral or international agreements among those
Member States considered sufficient?
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hand, complexity is added to the test by the use of the conjunctive adverb
"therefore" and the subordinate conjunction "by reason of."' 5 3 The conjunctive
adverb connects the first test of the Subsidiarity Clause with the second test in a
cumulative sense. In doing so, an aspect of cause is added. This is further
emphasized by the direct linkage of the conjunctive adverb and subordinate conjunction, "therefore, by reason of." The cumulative aspect and the aspect of
cause affirm the requirement that both tests be applied in tandem before an ultimate judgment in accordance with the Principle of Subsidiarity may be
reached.54
The Subsidiarity Clause does not raise any presumption of competence in
favor of the Community or the Member States. The Principle of Subsidiarity
constitutes a rule for the proper execution of Community powers (Kompetenzausubungsregel). As a decisive tool for the justification of proposed Community actions, other then those based on exclusive powers, the Subsidiarity
Clause asserts a general precedence or bias of Member State actions over Community actions. In this context, subsidiarity may be viewed as a general means
to distribute or allocate powers similar to that of other federal states, in which
state authority is the rule and federal authority the exception. 5 5
Despite this conclusion, it is nevertheless important to realize that the
wording of the Subsidiarity Clause does not provide any particular guideline for
its application. Nor does it fill the principle with an unambiguous meaning or
any indication toward its justiciability. The wording of the clause simply suggests that a comparative assessment of national and Community measures be
taken before the Community can take action. This leaves ample room for argument, as it is particularly unclear how the Community may prove the application
of such comparative measures. Does a comparative assessment in the final result prove to be nothing more than a political question as it might involve delicate political choices? If so, it is questionable whether the European Court of
Justice would be equipped to decide subsidiarity issues raised in a suit before the
Court. Similar to the political question doctrine in the United States, this raises
the additional question of whether it should be the task of the judicial body to
answer political questions at all. 56 This proves troublesome with regard to the
53. EC TREATY art. 5(2) (ex art. 3b (2)).
54. According to the cumulative character of the first and second test of the Subsidiarity
Clause, the Community may not take immediate action if the first test indicates that a proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States. Regardless of the insufficiency, the Community institutions must continue to evaluate the scale or effect of their proposed actions. This is of
significant importance, as it seems most unlikely that a proposed action can be achieved sufficiently
at both the Community and Member State level.
55. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8(3); U.S. CoNsr, amend. X; see also Grundgesetz [Constitution] art. 30 (Germany): "Die Ausubung der staatlichen Befugnisse und die Erfillung der staatlichen Aufgaben ist Sache der Ldnder, soweit dieses Grundgesetz keine andere Regelung trifft oder
zulid&t." ["Except as otherwise provided or permitted by this Basic Law, the exercise of governmental powers and the discharge of governmental functions is a matter for the Linder."]; DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 33-35 (1994).
56. See, e.g., W. Lawrence Church, History and the ConstitutionalRole of Courts, 1990 Wis.
L. REV. 1071, 1098-1103; MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLmCAL ORDER:
JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLrTCAL THEORY 3-7 (Carolina Academic Press) (1991);
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Court itself
separation of powers doctrine, as well as the fact that the European
57
is responsible for the broad extension of European powers.
B.

Community Approach to the Application of Subsidiarity

In 1992, as a direct result of national reservations toward the ratification of
the Maastricht Treaty, the European Council attempted to adopt guidelines for
the application of subsidiarity. In the Birmingham Declaration of October 16,
1992,58 the European Council focused on the necessary support of the Community by its citizens. The Member States reaffirmed that "decisions must be taken
as closely as possible to the citizen" and stressed that "great unity can be
achieved without excessive centralization."'5 9 The Member States concluded
that "[t]he Community can only act where Member States have given it the
power to do so in the Treaties. Action at the Community level should happen
only when proper and necessary...
On its way to achieving that goal the
Principle of Subsidiarity was named the most essential measure. 6'
While not spelling out particular guidelines in the Birmingham Declaration,
the European Council clearly highlighted the importance of the Principle of Subsidiarity as a means to limit centralization. Furthermore, the European Council
emphasized the need for Member States to retain ultimate authority over the
Community Treaties, as the Community can only act where the Member States
have transferred their powers.
Following the Birmingham Declaration, the European Council made an effort to express more explicit guidelines in its Conclusions of the Edinburgh
meeting on December 11-12, 1992.62 The Council affirmed that the European
Union rests on the Principle of Subsidiarity, which "contributes to the respect
for the national identities of Member States and safeguards their powers." 63 The
Council determined that the Subsidiarity Clause in the EC Treaty, Art. 5 Sec. 2
(ex Art. 3b Sec. 2) would determine whether the Community should act in a
given circumstance. 64 Furthermore, it defined subsidiarity in terms of "a dynamic concept to be applied in the light of the objectives set out in the
Treaty." 65 Accordingly, expanded Community actions were allowed only where
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1-9 (Harv. Univ.

Press) (1980); FRITZ WILHELM SCHARPF, GRENZEN DER RiCHTERLICHEN VERANTWORTUNG: DIE PoLITICAL-QUESTION-DOKTRIN

(1965).
57.

IN

DER RECHTSPRECHUNG

DES

AMERIKANISCHEN

SUPREME

COURT

See Christoph Henkel, Constitutionalism of the European Union: Judicial Legislation and

PoliticalDecision-Making by the European Court of Justice, 19 WIs. INT'L L.J. (2001)

58.
59.
60.

E.C. Bull., no. 10, at 9, point 1.8 (1992).
Id. at 9, point 1.8., 5.
Id.

61.

Id.

62.
63.
64.
65.

E.C. Bull., no. 12, at 7 (1992).
Id. at 12-13, point 1.15., 1.
Id. at 13, point 1.15., 2.
Id. at 7, point 1.1. and at 13-14, point. 1.15.,

5.
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required by the circumstances and, conversely, restricted if the circumstances no
66
longer justified intervention.
For the application of the Subsidiarity Clause of the Treaty, the European
Council attempted to be more explicit by outlining three conditions. 67 However,
these conditions are little more than an extensive repetition of the Subsidiarity
Clause itself. In fact, the conditions spelled out by the European Council are
limited to repeating the actual wording of the clause in EC Treaty, Article 5 Sec.
2 (ex Article 3b Sec. 2).
One may argue that the European Council failed to produce clarifying
guidelines for the application of subsidiarity. In conjunction with its conclusions at the meeting in Edinburgh, the European Council did, however, convey a
number of procedural thoughts that may serve as important steps toward a formal application of subsidiarity. 68 The European Council considered the Commission, with its right of legislative initiative, 69 the most crucial force in the
implementation of the Principle of Subsidiarity. As such, the European Council
found that the Commission, in accordance with the proposed systematic use of
consultation, could make the subsidiarity aspects of proposed legislation part of
future consultations with the Member States. Furthermore, the Commission was
specifically required to submit an annual report to the European Council and the
European Parliament on the application of the Treaty in the area of
70
subsidiarity.
With regard to the procedures of the Council of Ministers as the ultimate
Community legislator, 7 1 the European Council found that the regular examination of the implementation of the Principle of Subsidiarity "should become an
integral part of the overall examination of any Commission proposal."7 2 Existing Council rules, such as the rules on voting, should apply to such examination. Moreover, the examination should include the Council's own evaluation of
"whether [a] Commission proposal is totally or partially in conformity" with the
Principle of Subsidiarity 73 followed by the evaluation of whether any change
envisioned by the Council continues to conform with the principle. 74 All other
66. Id. at 12-14, point 1.15.
67. Id. at 14-15, point 1.18.
68. Id. at 15-16, points 1.20-1.22.
69. EC TREATY art. 211 (ex art. 155). The Commission is the executive branch of the European Union; it formulates programs for general legislation, initiates the legislative process by drafting legislation, carries out administrative tasks assigned to it and oversees as well as enforces
compliance with the law.
70. Id. at 16, point 1.21., 1 3.
71. The Council of Ministers must be distinguished from the European Council. The Council
of Ministers is the collective head of state of the European Union and consists of representatives of
the governments of the Member States. The Council of Ministers exercises primary legislative
power within the Union, does however not share the exclusive power of the Commission to initiate
legislation. See EC TREATY arts. 202-10 (ex arts. 145-54). The European Council is the Council of
Ministers meeting as heads of state or government. It is a forum which holds biannual summit
meetings. See TEU art. 4 (ex art. D).
72. E.C. Bull., no. 12, at 16, point 1.22. (1992).
73. Id. at 16, point 1.22., 9 3.
74. Id. at 16, point 1.22., 9 3.
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Community institutions, committees and working groups participating in the
legislative process of the Community, such as the European Parliament or the
Permanent Representatives of the Member States,7 5 are also obliged to describe
how the Principle of Subsidiarity should be applied on a given proposal. 76
To be sure, the statements of the European Council with regard to procedures and practices in the application of subsidiarity fall short of providing specific meaning. The most appropriate practice may be the earlier characterization
of procedural thoughts, which puts these statements in the context of soft law,
provided by political guidelines. On the other hand, the attempt of the European
Council to establish a procedural standard of judgment at least suggests that the
Community legislators, Commission and Council must evaluate the impact of
Community legislation under the aspects of subsidiarity in a transparent
manner. 77
C.

Justiciability of the Subsidiarity Clause

The question remains as to how to apply the Principle of Subsidiarity and
how to review compliance by the Community and its institutions. The responsibility to answer these questions inevitably rested upon the judiciary, as evidenced by past developments of the Community. Indeed, the Member States
themselves have advocated this very concept. In the Conclusions of the Edinburgh meeting, the European Council noted, "The Principle of Subsidiarity cannot be regarded as having direct effect; however, interpretation of this principle,
as well as review of compliance with it by the Community institution, are subject to control by the Court of Justice, as far as matters falling within the Treaty
establishing the European Community are concerned. ''7 8 Making the Principle
of Subsidiarity subject to judicial review, however, requires an applicable standard of review. The search for such a standard in Community Law leads only to
75. See, e.g., EC TREATY art. 207(l) (ex art. 151).
76. E.C. Bull., no. 12, at 16, point 1.22. (1992).
77. It is essential to recognize remaining limitations as well as the historical context in which
these statements were made. The Community institutions, particularly the Commission, continue to
have broad legislative discretion, even after the Nice European Council Meeting of December 2000.
In addition, the only clear conclusion to be drawn from the Birmingham Declaration and the Conclusions of the Edinburgh meeting are the hopes that Member States associate with the Principle of
Subsidiarity. Finally, both statements were intended to revitalize the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty in the Member States, particularly after the ratification had failed in Denmark and the realization of European Union seemed increasingly unlikely. See Protocolon the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality,1997 O.J. (C 340), 105; InterinstitutionalDeclarationon
Democracy, Transparency and Subsidiarity, E.C. Bull., no. 10, at 102, point 1.6.2., at 118-19, point
1.6.2. (1993); InterinstitutionalAgreement- Observing the Principleof Subsidiarity, E.C. Bull., no.
10, at 102, point 1.6.3., at 119-20, point 2.2.2 (1993).
78. E.C. Bull., no. 12, at 14, point 1.15., 5 (1992). Leaving the interpretation of the Principle
of Subsidiarity to the European Court of Justice does not take the political question doctrine into
account. Instead, by making it the task of the judicial body, the European Council and Member
States simply shifted the responsibility and escaped accountability. However, with a lack of existing
political procedures in the European Communities, the Court might be the only institution appropriately suited to scrutinize the application and interpretation of the Subsidiarity Principle. This does
not make the judiciary the ultimate and appropriate arbiter of political questions; it simply demonstrates that courts are able to decide political issues and have been relied upon to do so in the past.
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the legal concept of "proportionality" and the requirement to show sufficient
ground.
1.

Principle of Proportionality

In European Community law, the Principle of Proportionality is based on
the case law of the European Court of Justice and is one of the most important
standards of interpretation and lawfulness. 79 With the Maastricht Treaty, the

Principle of Proportionality was positively admitted to the EC Treaty; it states
"[a]ny action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
80
achieve the objectives of this Treaty."
Proportionality is of particular significance for the protection of fundamental rights, because Community law does not provide a codified standard for the
limitation of such rights. 8 ' The standard is primarily based on the Principle of
Proportionality, developed by German Constitutional Law and the rulings of the
German Supreme Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht.82 Although not identical in all its contents, the European Principle of Proportionality shares the same
cornerstones and concept as the German principle.
The Principle of Proportionality may be best compared with the rational
basis test developed in accordance with equal protection and the Fourteenth
Amendment in the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court. Under the rational basis
test of the Fourteenth Amendment, legislative or administrative acts must meet

minimum rationality requirements. 83 Broadly described, legislative acts have a
foundation of reasonableness-legislative requirements or classifications must
79. Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, E.C.R. 419, 425, 7 (1969); Case
11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1125, 1136, 16 (1970). See also Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, E.C.R. 1125, 1146-47 (1970) (Opinion of Advocate General Dutheillet de
Lamothe).
80. EC TREATY art. 5 (3) (ex art. 3b (3)). Although only referencing the "necessity" requirement of the principle of proportionality, this cannot be interpreted as any form of restriction on
"suitability" or "rationality." Instead, the premise of "necessity" annotates the codification of the
principle of proportionality in its entirety. See Case 112/80, Firma Anton Durbeck v. Hauptzollamt
Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen, E.C.R. 1095, 1118-19,
40-41 (1981); see also BVerfGE 89, 155,
212. Furthermore, the term "mesures nrcessaires" in the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 8-11, is interpreted by the European Court on Human
Rights as including the rationality test. The European Court of Justice is bound by this interpretation, See TEU art. 6 (2) (ex art. F (2)). See also Case 36/75, Roland Rutili v. Minister for the
Interior, E.C.R. 1219, 1232, 32 (1975).
81. This conclusion holds true even after the Member States enacted a Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union in Nice. The legal status of the Charter remains undecided. See also
supra note 80.
82. LORD MACKENZIE STUART, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 31-32
(1977); NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 2-3

(1996). For a critical point of view, see Sophie Boyron, Proportionality in English Administrative

Law: A Faulty Translation? 12 OJLS 237 (1992). The Bundesverfassungsgericht or German Supreme Court is the highest court in the Federal Republic of Germany and can best be compared with
the U.S. Supreme Court. In the broadest sense, the Court reviews the constitutionality of legal acts
and the application of such acts in Germany. The jurisdiction of the Court is regulated in Grundgesetz [Constitution] art. 93 (Germany).
83. TRIBE, supra note 11.
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be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.84 The Principle of
Proportionality attempts to achieve a similar result as the rational basis test, the
difference is its attempt to do so by means of a more effective and structured
approach.
In fact, the primary goal of the Principle of Proportionality is planned efficiency of Community acts. The principle requires that any Community act permitted by the provisions of the Community Treaties, be suited and necessary to
achieve its legislative intent. 85 Among equally suitable measures available for
the achievement of this goal, the least burdensome measure must be chosen.
Furthermore, the burden imposed by the act must stand in reasonable relation86
ship to the legislative intent.
In the case law of the European Court of Justice, the execution of the Principle of Proportionality is conducted through a threefold test. A Community act
that fails to fulfill any one of the three requirements must be ruled unproportional and void. The first test is the suitability of a Community act, including
the determination of a goal permitted by the Community Treaties
(Geeignetheit).87 The suitability test is based on an empirical-prognostic evaluation of the effects a Community act might attain within its field of application.
The time of enactment must be definitive because assumed suitability cannot be
questionable in the retroactive sense. 8 8 As for the lack of certain predictions
and the wide margin of discretion provided by the Community Treaties, 8 9 the
European Court is reluctant to declare any act invalid on the basis of the absence
of suitability alone. 90 In fact, the Court only examines whether the legislative
intent of a Community tact was "obviously inappropriate for the realization of
9
the desired objective."
The second test evaluates the necessity of the act. 92 If various suitable
measures are available, necessity is determined by the least burdensome mea84. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985). The rational
basis test was amended by additional equal protection theories, such as the conceivable basis test, the

theory of legislative approximation, inclusiveness or strict scrutiny.
85. Case 265/87, Hermann Schrader HS Kraftfutter GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt
Gronau, E.C.R. 2237, 2270, J1 20-24 (1989); Case 127/91, Comptoir National Technique Agricole
(CNTA) v. Minist~re de I Agriculture, E.C.R. 1-5681, 5697, 23 (1992).

86. Id.
87. See, e.g., EmILIOU, supra note 82, at 191-92.
88. Case 276/809, Padana, E.C.R. 517, 551 (1982) (Opinion of Advocate-General Reischl).
89. Case 29/77, SA. Roquette Frrres v. French State-Administration des Douanes, E.C.R.
1835, 1840-45, V 12-35 (1977).

90. So far the Court has only found certain national acts based on the EC Treaty art. 36 to fail
the suitability test. See, e.g., Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fir
Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), E.C.R. 649, 663-664, M 12-14 (1979); Case 271/87, Commission of

6-23 (1989).
the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany, E.C.R. 229, 252-256,
14
91. Case 40/72, I. Schroeder KG v. Federal Republic of Germany, E.C.R. 125, 142,
(1973). See also Case 256/90, Mignini SpA v. Azienda di Stato per gli Interventinel Mercato
Agricolo (AIMA), E.C.R. 1-2651, 2684, 16 (1992); Case 265/87, Schrider HS Kraftfutter GmbH &
Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Gronau, E.C.R. 2237, 2269-2270,

20-24 (1989); Joined Cases 279, 280,

285 and 286/84, Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke and Others v. Commission of the European Communities, E.C.R. 1069, 1125-26,

92.

34 (1987).

See, e.g., EmrLtOU, supra note 82, at 192.
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sure (Erforderlichkeit/Notwendigkeit). The necessity test plays the most important role in the case law of the European Court of Justice. Of the measures
available, each must be equally appropriate to achieve the objective pursued and
the Community legislator is not required to make use of a less efficient means.
If a less burdensome measure, in principal, achieves the legislative intent but
does not do so with the same level of certainty, it may be equally appropriate.93
For the final application and choice among equally suitable measures, the Community is entitled to its own discretion and its own scope of judgment
94
Both the necessity and suitability test share the need
(Beurteilungsspielraum).
for an evaluation between a desired objective and its realization. Only from this
starting point is it possible to assess the burden imposed by a legislative act.9 5
Nevertheless, with regard to the responsibility and area of conduct, the Community institutions often are unable to prevent wholesale or very general decisions.
Under specific circumstances certain group interests may be neglected for reasons of overall integration and legal unity. 9 6
The third and final test is the selected proportionality or adequacy test
(Verhdltnismi]igkeit im engeren Sinne/Angemessenheit). 7 The burden of an
act must be balanced against its legislative intent and both burden and intent
must stand in reasonable relationship to one another. This requires delineating
and evaluating the relationships of all affected legal and individual interests
based on the actual extent of the burden. The Court makes the final assessment
based on the general importance of the affected interests as well as the degree
and duration of the burden. The relationship between legislative intent and burden does not need to be a perfectly balanced one, but the goal is to prevent
disparities. The European Court of Justice applies the selected proportionality
test in a very reserved fashion. It interprets this test as a quasi-global98evaluation
between the advantages and disadvantages of a proposed measure.
Having described the legal concept of proportionality in Community law, it
remains questionable whether the Principle of Proportionality can in fact provide
a sufficient standard for judicial review of subsidiarity. Indeed, a number of
scholars have suggested that the Principle of Proportionality may prove to en93. See, e.g., Case 55/56, F~drderation Charbonni~re de Belgique v. High Authority, E.C.R.
2921 (1955-56); C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di
Milano, E.C.R. 1-4165, 37 (1995).
94. Case 280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Communities,
E.C.R. 1-4973, 5068-69, 1 90 (1994). Judicial review of the exercise of discretion is "thereby limited
to the examination of whether it has been vitiated by manifest error or misuse of powers, or whether
the institution concerned has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion." For an example of
these limits on judicial review, see Case 84/94, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland v. Council of the European Communities, E.C.R. 1-5755, 5811, 58 (1996).
95. If a specific aspect of a burden proves impossible, the Community must name objective
standards under which the burden imposed appears less burdensome. The objective perspective of
the affected party is thereby of utmost importance. See, e.g., Case 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders
36-37 (1988).
v. The Netherlands State, E.C.R. 2085, 2135,
96. Case 5/73, Balkan-Import-Export GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof, E.C.R. 1091,
1110-12, V 19-23 (1973); Case 12/78, Italian Republic v. Commission of the European Communities, 1731, 1749-50 (1979).
97. See, e.g., EMJLIOU, supra note 82, at 192-94.
22-23 (1973).
98. See Case 5/73, Balkan-Import-Export, E.C.R. 1091, 111 1-12,
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hance justiciability of subsidiarity and reliably indicate the future direction of
Court rulings on the issue of subsidiarity. 99 However, in order to decide
whether this evaluation holds true, one must first review the differences and
similarities between the principles. Moreover, beyond the specific characteristics of subsidiarity and proportionality, it is essential to determine whether a
correlation exists between the principles.
At first glance, there seems to be no immediate interrelation between the
Principle of Subsidiarity and the Principle of Proportionality, with both principles holding a broad area of application independent of and separate from each
other. While fundamental rights and basic freedoms are the focus of the Principle of Proportionality, the Principle of Subsidiarityjs directed at the protection
of Member State powers and identity.1 ° ° As such, the Principle of Subsidiarity
is an important means for the allocation and distribution of powers between
concurrent powers of the Community and the Member States. Furthermore,
subsidiarity is intended to increase the awareness of the citizen's interests, thus
maintaining national identity and improving accountability. In the latter context,
subsidiarity must also be understood as a means to ensure grassroots politics.
Conversely, the Principle of Proportionality applies to both concurrent and exclusive Community powers. It focuses on planned efficiency of Community
acts in general. These differences display the distinct character of subsidiarity
and proportionality.
However, the systematic placement of the Principle of Proportionality in
the EC Treaty suggests a different conclusion. As the rule directly following the
Subsidiarity Clause, proportionality indicates a close relationship with subsidiarity. 01 Indeed, the Subsidiarity Clause contains elements of the Principle
of Proportionality. The Subsidiarity Clause, for example, must represent a necessary solution among various available alternatives.' 0 2 Furthermore, the need
to place subsidiarity in relation to a Treaty objective clearly demonstrates similarities to the suitability test provided under the Principle of Proportionality.
Both require the choice of a valid Community concern, which defines the outcome of suitability. Subsidiarity and proportionality also share a common bond
in their purpose and ultimate goal. The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Principle of Proportionality are used in order to regulate Community powers, with the
99. Jean Paul Jacqu6 & Joseph H. H. Weiler, On the Road to European Union - A New Judicial Architecture: An Agendafor the Intergovernmental Conference, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 185,

202-06 (1990); Dehousse, supra note 42, 13-17; Bermann, supra note 44, at 386-90. Professor
Bermann seems to misunderstand the different measures of the Principle of Proportionality. While
not differentiating the various measures properly, he omits the suitability test as the first test of
proportionality. In fact, in his described order of examination Professor Bermann starts with the
reasonable relationship between measure and objective or the "rationality component" of the proportionality test. This, however, is the final test to be applied. Furthermore, his second and third tests
are not to be considered separate; they are both part of the second test and must be considered
together. What Professor Bermann describes as the "utility component" is as much a part of the
necessity test as the objective of a least burdensome measure. Evidently, arguments based on such
misunderstanding cannot entirely be convincing.
100. Dehousse, supra note 42, at 1.
101. Zuleeg, supra note 42, at 190.
102.

HELMUT LECHELER, DAS SUBSIDIARITATSPRINZIP 61 (1993).
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view of limiting any violation of rights or values assumed to be of higher
importance.
Despite having reached this point, the question of whether proportionality
can be a meaningful tool for judicial review of subsidiarity remains. Beyond
differences and similarities, the Principle of Proportionality adds an established
and pragmatic component to the interpretation of subsidiarity. This is important
with regard to issues of suitability and necessity. As established legal concepts,
the suitability and necessity requirements may make similar evaluations required
by the Principle of Subsidiarity more permissive.' 0 3 It would be wrong to argue
that any Community action found unproportional cannot stand in accordance
with the Principle of Subsidiarity. That argument would eliminate subsidiarity
as a standard of review. In fact, proportionality would supersede subsidiarity,
resulting in a conclusion that would skew both principles. It is therefore imperative to realize that while both principles manifest distinct differences, their independent spheres of application buttress one another. Proportionality can indeed
function as an auxiliary means of interpretation or an additional safeguard for
subsidiarity.
After complying with the Principle of Subsidiarity, any Community act
must be evaluated by the standards of proportionality. While a proposed act
may comply with the Principle of Subsidiarity, it may, at the same time, be
found invalid under the premises of proportionality. A proposed act of that kind
would fail to be enacted as a Community law, demonstrating that, on a different
level, proportionality generates an additional standard of review for subsidiarity.
In short, both principles operate in turns, albeit at two different levels of
Community action. The Principle of Subsidiarity determines whether action is
to be set in motion, whereas the principle of proportionality defines the scope of
the action. Accordingly, proportionality is to be considered in relation to actions
already taken, and its purpose in ensuring compliance with the Treaty's objectives. 1 4 Only as part of this interplay can the Principle of Proportionality be a
useful tool to enhance the justiciability of subsidiarity.
2.

The Requirement to Show Sufficient Grounds

Perhaps the only objective standard for judicial review of subsidiarity is
provided by the procedural requirement to show sufficient grounds. The sufficient grounds standard is articulated in EC Treaty, Art. 253 (ex Art. 190):
"[riegulations, directives and decisions adopted by the European Parliament and
the Council, and such acts adopted by the Council or the Commission, shall state
103. Nevertheless, it is important to note the clear reluctance of the European Court of Justice
to invalidate Community actions based on questions of suitability alone. Likewise with regard to the
necessity test, the Court acknowledges an area of broad Community discretion only subject to limited judicial review. See Case C-233/94, Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament and
Council of the European Union, E.C.R. 1-2405, 2461, 56 (1997).
104. Case 84/94, United Kingdom v. Council, [1996] E.C.R. 1-5758, 5783, point 123-128
(1996) (Opinion of Advocate General Mr. .,ger). See also Keon Lenaerts & P. van Ypersele, Le
Principe de Subsidiaritd et son Context: Etude de IArticle 3B du Traitj CE, 30 CAHIERS DE DROIT
EUROPfEN, 3, 52-57 (1994).
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or opinions
the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals
10 5
which were required to be obtained pursuant to this Treaty."
The European Court of Justice has held that in order to show sufficient
grounds:
Community measures must include a statement of the facts and law that led the
institution in question to adopt them, so as to make possible reviews by the Court
and so that the Member States and the nationals concerned may have knowledge
of the conditions under which the Community institutions have applied the

Treaty. 106
Despite this holding, the Court has limited the standard by further stating
that the "failure to refer to a precise provision of the Treaty need not necessarily
constitute an infringement of essential procedural requirements when the legal
basis for the measure may be determined from the other parts of the measure,"
but that "explicit reference is indispensable where, in its absence, the parties
10 7
concerned and the Court are left uncertain as to the precise legal basis."
When one applies the rules enunciated by the European Court of Justice to
the Principle of Subsidiarity, it is clear that detailed reasoning to show sufficient
grounds is unnecessary. While the reasoning may include the legislative intent
of a Community act and the evaluations and conclusions determined by the twofold test set forward in the Subsidiarity Clause, neither is truly required to show
sufficient grounds. In fact, it is sufficient for a directive to simply indicate the
legal basis or legislative intent, extrapolated from considerations of the European Parliament or other Community institutions participating in the legislative
proceedings of the act.
The value of the procedural requirement to show sufficient grounds, as a
standard for judicial review of subsidiarity, is highly questionable. As a minimal standard, albeit justiciable, it cannot provide the much needed tool for interpretation and review of compliance with subsidiarity. The requirement to show
sufficient ground remains overly broad and ambiguous. Indeed, the Court is
limited in its power of review to verifying whether reasons have even been
stated or indicated.
3.

Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament & Council: An
Example of the Application of Subsidiarity in the European Court of
Justice

Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Court of Jus08
tice has been presented with a variety of cases on the subject of subsidiarity.
105. EC TREATY, art. 253 (ex art. 190).
106. Case 45/86, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities, E.C.R. 1493, 1519, 5 (1987). See also Case 41/93, French Republic v. Commission of
the European Communities, E.C.R. 1-1829, 1850, 34 (1994); Case 158/80, REWE-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH and REWE-Markt Steffen v. Hauptzollamt Kiel, E.C.R. 1805, 1833, 25 (1981).
107. Case 45/86, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities, E.C.R. 1493, 1519-20 (1987).
108. See, e.g., Case 84/94, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Council of
the European Communities, E.C.R. 1-5755, 5810-5811, 1154-55 (1996). See also id., 1-5758, 5783,
point 123-128 (Opinion of the Advocate General Mr. IUger); Case 91/95P, Roger Tremblay &
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Nevertheless, Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament & Council"° 9 was the first case that addressed the question of whether Community legislation should be annulled due to a violation of the Principle of Subsidiarity.
Germany challenged a Community directive aimed at the European banking industry. The goal of the directive was to introduce a mandatory bank deposit-guarantee scheme in all Member States and to harmonize the relevant
national guarantees with a minimum deposit.' 10 During the legislative proceedings, Germany tried to prevent the directive from being adopted, but failed. As
a result of required majority voting, Germany was outvoted by the remaining
Member States."' In response, it initiated an action before the Court and argued that, without the constraints set by a Community directive, the German
national deposit-guarantee scheme would sufficiently achieve the objectives pursued by the Community directive." 12
The German deposit-guarantee scheme is a voluntary insurance body,
which is not under state control. At the time of the enactment of the challenged
directive, all three hundred credit institutions set up in Germany belonged to a
guarantee scheme with the exception of only five. Moreover, any credit institution that did not belong to an authorized deposit-guarantee body in Germany
was required to inform its customers of that fact before an account was
opened.' 13
The German government contended that the directive should be annulled
based on three points. First, Germany challenged the legal basis of the directive,
arguing that the adoption of the directive would have required a unanimous vote
by all Member States.' 14 In particular, Germany claimed the directive5 should
have been based on the implied power prerogative of the EC Treaty. 1
Second, the German government argued that there had been a breach of the
obligation to show sufficient grounds under EC Treaty, Art. 253 (ex Art. 190).
The German government did not claim that the directive infringed upon the
Principle of Subsidiarity, but only that the Community legislature did not set out
Others v. Commission, E.C.R. 1-5547, 5574-75, 11 20-25 (1996); Case T-5/93, Roger Tremblay &
Others v. Comission, E.C.R. U-185, 209 (1995); Case 11/95, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Belgium, E.C.R. 1-4115, 4t68-4169 (1996); Case 415/93, Union Royale Belge
Des Societes De Football Association (ASBL) and Others v. Jean-Marc Bosman, E.C.R. 1-4921,
5065, 81 (1995); Cases 430 & 431/93, Jeroen Van Schijndel & Johannes Van Veen v. Stiching
Pensioen Voor Fysiotherapeuten, E.C.R. 1-4705, 4715, point 27 (1995) (Opinion of Advocate
General).
109. Case 233/94, Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament & Council of the European Communities, E.C.R. 1-2405(1997) (action under EC TREATY, Art. 230 (ex art. 173)).
110. 1994 O.J. (L 135) 5. See also Commission Recommendation of 22 Dec. 1986 Concerning
the Introduction of Deposit Guarantee Schemes, 1987 O.J. (L 33) 16.

I1I. Case 233/94, Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament & Council of the European Communities, E.C.R. 1-2411, 2412, point 9 (1997) (Opinion of Advocate General Lager).
112. Id. at 2412, point 10.
113. Id. at 2415-16, point 17-24; See also Case 233/94, Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament & Council E.C.R. 1-2441, 2467, 78 (Judgment of the Court) (1997).
114. Case 233/94, Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament & Council of the European Communities, E.C.R. 1-2441, 2448-49, n 10-11 (1997) (Judgment of the Court).
115.

EC TREATY art. 308 (ex art. 235).
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the grounds to substantiate the compatibility of its actions with the principle. 16
In light of the Principle of Subsidiarity, Germany asserted that the Community
institutions must give detailed reasons to explain why only the Community, to
the exclusion of the Member States, is empowered to act in the area in question. '7 In addition, it argued that the directive did not indicate in what respect
the objectives could not have been effectively met by action at the Member State
level or grounds which established the need for Community action.t'8
Third, the German government argued that the directive was contrary to the
Principle of Proportionality as set out in the conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council." 9 The conclusions stipulated that the Community, when adopting legislative measures, should endeavor to take account of "well-established
' 20
national practices."'
Ultimately, the European Court rejected all arguments made by the German
government. With regard to the first argument, the Court ruled that the directive
was adopted in accordance with the creation of the Internal market and thus
based on the correct Treaty provision, which mandated a qualified majority
vote.' 2 ' Second, concerning the obligation to show sufficient grounds, the
Court relied on minimum requirements established by prior case law.' 22 According to the Court, showing sufficient grounds is necessary when it is not
apparent which reasons led the Community institutions to adopt certain legislation.' 23 Only then can the Court exercise its power of review. The Court noted
that the preamble of the directive clearly reflected the Community legislature's
view that the objective could best be achieved at the Community level.' 24 Further, the European Parliament and the Council stated in the preamble that any
action taken by the Member States to implement a Commission recommendation
would not fully achieve the desired result. As such, the Court found that the
directive complied with the obligation to show sufficient grounds. ' 25 Moreover,
the Court held that an express reference to the Principle of Subsidiarity in the
26
directive is not required.'
116. Case 233/94, Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament & Council of the European Communities, E.C.R. 1-2441, 2451-56, 1 22-24 (1997) (Judgment of the Court).
117. Id.
118.

Id.

119. Id. at 2467, in 76-78.
120. Id. at 2460-62, 77.
121. Id. at 2449, B 13-14. In particular, the Court held that it was the aim of the directive "to
prevent the Member States from invoking depositor protection in order to impede the activities of
credit institutions authorized in other Member States," clarifying the intent to "abolish obstacles to
the right of establishment and the freedom to provide service." Id. at 2451, 1 19.
122. Id.at 2452, J 25, citing Case 41193, French Republic v. Commission of the European
Communities, E.C.R. 1-1829, 34 (1994).
123. Id. at 2452; 2455-56, In 35-38. See also Case 233/94, Federal Republic of Germany v.
European Parliament & Council of the European Communities, E.C.R. 1-2411, 2425, point 71 (1997)
(Opinion of the Advocate General Lger).
124. Case 233/94, Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament & Council of the European Communities, E.C.R. 1-2441, 2452-53,
26-28 (Judgment of the Court).
125. Id. 27.
126. Id. 28.
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Finally, the Court found it unnecessary to determine the precise legal value
of the conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council.' 27 It pointed out that the
Community legislature cannot simply respect all "well-established national practices' 128 when harmonizing legislation.' 29 In fact, the Court stated that the
Community may consider harmonizing legislation concerning laws such as deat any time and wherever deposits are located within
posit-guarantee 1schemes
30
Community.
the
The restraint in interpreting the Principle of Subsidiarity in more detail or
in establishing additional justiciable standards is apparent in the Court's ruling.
Not only did the Court refuse to set measures for a more specific interpretation
of the requirement to show sufficient grounds with regard to the Principle of
Subsidiarity, it clearly did not determine the legal value of a political statement
by Member States or the Conclusions of the European Council in Edinburgh. It
is fair to argue that the European Court of Justice will most likely continue to
interpret the Principle of Subsidiarity in a rather formal and cautious fashion.
To prevent damage to further European integration and the relations between the
Community and its Member States, the European Court of Justice would be well
advised to take seriously the Member States' concerns as expressed in the Subsidiarity Principle. The idea of subsidiarity was incorporated into the EC Treaty
to diminish the widespread discontent with a political process that is too far
removed from, and not responsive to, the concerns of citizens and Member
States.
Despite this conclusion, the context in which the described action was
brought before the Court is most significant. It reveals how a Member State that
was overruled by a majority vote tried to circumvent this rather democratic outcome by challenging the legal basis of the Community legislation in question.
Further, it demonstrates that Member States of the European Union remain uncertain about whether or not to commit themselves to a more democratic system
that is increasingly independent from a single Member State's influence.
4.

ContradictingPerspectives and Limitations within the Principle of
Subsidiarity

Due to the difficulty of enforcement, it is not clear if subsidiarity as a rule
of law or a constitutional norm will succeed in bringing together a closer union
while maintaining national sovereignty. It remains particularly disputable
whether, on the basis of the Principle of Subsidiarity alone, a "[g]reater union
can be achieved without excessive centralization."' i 3' This question becomes
even more significant if one considers that both advanced European integration,
which undoubtedly requires a certain amount of centralization, and national sovereignty contravene one another. It is a paradox that, on one hand, the Member
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 2468, 1 80.
Id. at 2467, I19 76-77.
Id. at 2468, 1 80.
Id. 82.
E.C. Bull. no. 10, at 9, point 1.8., 1 5 (1992).
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States advocate a closer union while, on the other hand, they are afraid to lose
their national powers or identities. But this is only the most obvious paradox of
example, the
subsidiarity. There are additional inherent tensions as well. 13For
2
principle holds two opposing perspectives or dual functions.
The two opposing perspectives of subsidiarity can be described most accurately with the economic doctrine of exit and voice, as advanced by Albert 0.
Hirschman in his analytical work Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. 1 33 Exit and voice
correlate to market and non-market forces that are economic and political mechanisms, respectively. 134 Exit as the realm of economics is impersonal and indirect. A customer who is dissatisfied with a product of one firm shifts to that of
another, defending his welfare or improving his position. Market forces are set
in motion by this behavior, which induce recovery on the part of the firm that
has declined in comparative performance.' 3 5 Exit is impersonal and indirect
because it avoids face-to-face confrontation. In general, the customer makes
decisions in the anonymity of the marketplace. The results of decisions
are only
36
transferred through statistics and not by the articulation of a voice.'
Voice, as the political alternative to exit, depends on direct communication,
the articulation of opinion, protest and affirmation. Voice is understood as the
political action par excellence and can graduate from faint grumbling to violent
protest. 137 It is defined as any attempt to change, rather than to escape from, an
objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition
138
by various types of actions.
Applied to the Principle of Subsidiarity, voice refers to the actions that
citizens may use to have their concerns heard in the political process of the
Community. Voice is the active participation of individuals in Community
politics. Subsidiarity is the key to ensuring participation of that kind and to
increasing accountability while bringing government closer to the citizens. In
contrast, exit focuses on the issue of mobility between different Community
jurisdictions. Exit directs attention to the individual choice of location and inter132. See, e.g., J. H.H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403 (1991) and
Viktor Vanberg, Subsidiarity, Responsive Government and Individual Liberty, in SuBSIDARITAT:
IDEE UND WIRKLICHKErr: ZUR REIcHWEITE EINES PRINZIPS IN DEUTSCHLAND UND EUROPA 253 (Knut

Wolfgang Nrr & Thomas Oppermann eds., 1997).
133. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). The application of Hirschman's doctrine with regard to the
European Communities is also conducted by J.H.H. Weiler and Viktor Vanberg. Weiler uses the
doctrine of exit and voice to explain the paradox of European integration between the "inexorable
dynamism of enhanced supranationalism" and the "counter-development towards intergovernmentalism... away from European integration." Vanberg directly refers to the concept of subsidiarity as a
constitutional norm and distinguishes between what he calls the "communitarian" and "libertarian
subsidiarity." See J.H.H. Weiler, supra note 132 at 2410-12; Viktor Vanberg, supra note 132.
134. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 133, at 15-20.
135. Id. at 15.

136.

Id. at 15-16, 22-25.

137. id. at 16, 30-32.
138. Id. at 30. Hirschman specifies: "through individual or collective petition to the management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in
management, or through various types of actions and protests, including those that are meant to
mobilize public opinion."
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governmental competition. By shifting political authority to lower levels, it is
easier for citizens to compare particular advantages and disadvantages of different Community jurisdictions and escape from unwanted policies., 39 Thus, the
increase in the mobility of citizens and the possibility of more favorable policies
elsewhere, such as lower taxes, promote intergovernmental competition. While
voice aims to increase political participation with the goal of achieving improved governance at the national or lower level, exit presents mobility and
intergovernmental140competition as an instrument to limit the powers of government in general.
At first glance both voice and exit seem to make the same promise: to make
41
government more responsive. Voice can even be viewed as a residual to exit. 1
Some citizens who are not yet ready to escape a certain policy are more likely to
exercise the voice option. In addition, voice can act as an alternative. This
might be the case where the ability to influence a policy seems to offer greater
results than mere escape. Once exited, the opportunity to use voice is lost. In
certain settings the exit option thus becomes the ultima ratio. Finally, voice can
is simply not available, such as in a monopalso function as an alternative if exit
14 2
olistic or exclusive environment.
Despite these correlations, voice and exit are rather distinct options. Both
achieve their goals via differing approaches, resulting in contradictions and
competing paradigms. A similar observation has been made with regard to
American federalism and is expressed through the terms "rights of persons" versus "rights of places."' 1 4 3 These phrases refer to the tension between local selfgovernment and individual rights in federal political structures." 4 4 The placement of political authority closer to the source from which it originates, namely,
the people, creates the dilemma of choosing between individual and collective
freedom or between consumership and citizenship. The problem is that individual freedom often diminishes collective freedom. Measures that are conducive
to voice and the community in which political participation is exercised may be
detrimental to exit and the individual freedom to escape.' 4 5 To stay competitive, lower level governments depend on people and resources, not only to sustain their tax-base but simply to remain functional as a community.
Accordingly, exit must be contained. It is in this context that the conflict between voice and exit becomes apparent. Voice is primarily concerned with the
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Vanberg, supra note 133, at 254-55.
Id. at 254-56.
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 133, at 33-36.
Id. at 36-43.
Vanberg, supra note 133, at 259-60. See also John Kincaid, The Competitive Challenge to

Cooperative Federalism:A Theory of Federal Democracy, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND

87-114 (D. A. Kenyon
& John Kincaid eds., 1991); John Kincaid, Consumership versus Citizenship: Is there wiggle room
for local regulationsin global economy?, in FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FEDERAL STATES 27-47 (Brian
LOCAL GOVERNMENTs-EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM

Hocking ed., 1992).
144. Vanberg, supra note 133, at 260; See also James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil
Rights: Complementary and Competing Paradigms,47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1272-80 (1994).
145. Vanberg, supra note 133, at 259-62.
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transfer of powers to lower level government. It induces the regulatory authority to erect trade barriers against goods and services from other polities and to
establish an environment in support of special interests. 146 This stands in apparent contrast to the premise of exit, which is the limitation of regulatory powers
at whatever level exercised.
As inherent tensions of the Principle of Subsidiarity, the competing paradigms of exit and voice make it evident that the Member States, as lower level
governments, must be prevented from using their powers for protectionist purposes. The allocation of regulatory powers through the Principle of Subsidiarity
and the execution of such powers by the Member States must be constrained.
That is, subsidiarity must not be interpreted as an unconditional endorsement,
but rather a qualified one. 14 7 Where Community issues are involved, precautionary measures must be enforced in the application of regulatory powers by
the Member States. Even if the Principle of Subsidiarity, as put forward in the
Community Treaties, was a balanced means with which to limit the centralist
drift of the Community, it would be necessary to recognize the problems that
could occur on the Member State level and that could ultimately threaten the
level of Community integration that has been achieved.
IV.
CONCLUSION

The complexity and dilemma of subsidiarity lies in its broad and abstract
structural concept. Although the defining elements of the Principle of Subsidiarity are rather vague, its character as an applicable rule of law is not called
into question. Like the vast majority of legal statutes, the principle of Subsidiarity requires interpretation by the legal community, scholars, and courts to
achieve its full appreciation. Furthermore, it is important to note that concepts
of law may be dynamic in character. Through different periods of historical,
constitutional and social development, the understanding and interpretation of
specific rules of law may change. Accordingly, it might even be argued that
only a rule of law, which leaves room for and is open to interpretation, is fit for
the challenge of longevity, such as the Constitution of the United States of
America. In that sense it is necessary to find functional and judicial standards to
adequately apply the Principle of Subsidiarity.
Subsidiarity was not limited to a reference in the preamble to the Treaty on
European Union or the European Community Treaties. The Principle of Subsidiarity was specifically included in the European Community Treaty as a positive rule of law. The various anthropological and historical definitions of
subsidiarity, however, render only minimal aid to the interpretation of the Subsidiarity Clause. If historical, theological or social links are drawn, one may
even consider that a legal definition of subsidiarity does not exist. Even among
146.

Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundationsof

Secure Markets, 149 JOURNAL OF INSTITUrIONAL AND THEORETICAL EcONOMics 286, 291-92 (1993).

147.

Vanberg, supra note 133, at 267-68.
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the different Member States of the Community, the understanding of subsidiarity was and remains manifold.14 8 More importantly, however, it should be
remembered that subsidiarity in the European Communities stands before the
specific background of European integration. The Subsidiarity Clause is a
unique response to problems arising within the process of European integration.
To be sure, the European Community is a functional system aiming toward increased integration.
The Principle of Subsidiarity cannot consist of a material determination that
strictly enumerates the control of the Member States. The control is meant to be
functional, or in terms of American Constitutional Law subject to procedural
safeguards, since the goal of subsidiarity is the allocation of powers between the
Union as the center and the Member States as the periphery. 14 9 Whether the
interpretation of subsidiarity can be pursued in an objective or unbiased manner,
given the differing self-interests of the Member States, European Court of Justice, and European officials, remains questionable. Indeed, the ultimate power
to fill subsidiarity with meaning may not rest with those who have the power to
do so, but with those provided with the best bargaining positions. It will take
unrestricted commitment to European integration by the Member States, along
with political compromise and the acknowledgment of their responsibilities in
this context, to achieve a meaningful allocation of powers based on the Principle
of Subsidiarity.

148. See, e.g., Ian Ward, Identity and Difference: The European Union and Postmodernism, in
NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN UNION 15, 24-25 (Jo Shaw & Gillian More eds., 1995).
149. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in Selection and Composition of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546-60 (1954); Jesse H.
Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-6-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review,
86 YALE L. J. 1552 (1977); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495-503 (1977); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism:
"Converse-1983" in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1240-46 (1994). See also Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

